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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in France, including the opening of French
markets and the privatization of many of the companies nationalized in
the early 1980s, have made France one of the leading countries for in-
vestment by American companies seeking to enter Europe prior to the
unified European market in 1992.1 France's liberalization of foreign in-
vestment rules, as well as its lifting of foreign exchange controls, have
further helped make French companies among the most attractive for
both American and European investors.2
Reflecting the growing attractiveness of French companies, the
1 The 1992 program requires the 12 European Community ("EC") states- Belgium, Denmark,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and Germany-to create a single community for the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital by December 31, 1992. For an analysis of 1992 on the United States see U.S. Int'l Trade
Commission, Pub. No. 2204, The Effects of Greater Economic Integration Within the European Com-
munity on the United States (1989). For a discussion of the historical bases for the 1992 program see
Schildhaus, 1992 and the Single European Act, 23 INT'L LAW. 549 (1989); see also Berger, The
European Markets Try to Coordinate, Unify Conflicting Merger Law, Nat'l L.J, Nov. 6, 1989, at 14,
col. 1 (discussing the effect of 1992 on cross-border takeovers); Berger, EC To Lower Takeover Hur-
dles, The Recorder, Apr. 10, 1990 (reviewing development of EC takeover market).
2 France was the third most popular target nation for cross-border acquisitions within the EC
in 1989. See Translink, EUROPEAN DEAL REV. (1990) [hereinafter EUROPEAN DEAL REVIEW].
Some experts have estimated that between 3000 and 5000 French companies will change hands each
year over the next 10 years. See "France," in International M & A, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 41 (1991)
[hereinafter France].
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Paris stock market (the "Bourse") has grown substantially in recent
years, while successive French governments have taken a number of im-
portant actions to modernize the French securities markets.' Paris has
now become one of the leading stock exchanges on the European conti-
nent, and the privatization (and subsequent listing on the stock market)
of more than sixty previously nationalized companies, with a value in
excess of $35 billion, has dramatically increased the Bourse's market cap-
italization. The Bourse is now second, behind the London stock market,
as the most active European market in terms of companies listed. The
Bourse's domestic market capitalization has grown from less than $120
billion in 1987 to more than $190 billion by the end of 1988.' This figure
is likely to increase in the future as more recently privatized French com-
panies seek additional capital.5
Merger and acquisition activity within France has also grown dra-
matically in recent years. While the bulk of this activity involved French
companies as both buyer and seller, there were approximately 191 acqui-
sitions of French companies by companies based outside of France in
1989, at a total disclosed value of more than $6 billion.6 French compa-
nies have also grown more acquisitive of foreign companies in recent
years, with such well known American companies as Pennwalt Corpora-
tion, the European food businesses of RJR Nabisco, and Norton Com-
pany becoming targets for French companies.7 The purchase by French
companies of non-French assets has also increased demands by Ameri-
cans and other foreigners for reciprocity when they attempt to acquire a
French company, further pushing France to adopt even more favorable
rules for foreign investment.
These developments have made France an important topic for
American businesses interested in taking advantage of the single Euro-
pean market. However, American companies wishing to enter France
are still troubled by the apparent complexity of French law, and the rela-
3 While there are seven stock exchanges in France, the main exchange in Paris handles over
95% of the transactions in the country.
4 See 2 COOPERS & LYBRAND, BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 12
(1989) [hereinafter TAKEOVERS IN THE EC].
5 Id. An additional reason for expecting the market's continued growth is the fact that histori-
cally many companies have been reluctant to use the equity markets to raise additional capital.
Thus, France's market capitalization as a percentage of gross domestic product was approximately
twenty percent in 1988, placing France ahead of only Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece among EC
countries in this category. However, as issuing equity becomes more acceptable within France it can
be expected that additional companies will seek to sell shares to the public.
6 See EUROPEAN DEAL REVIEW, supra note 2; during the first six months of 1990 approxi-
mately 17% of the FFr 90.2bn takeover market represented foreign investment. France, supra note
2, at 41.
7 See Graham, Time to Take the War to the Enemy, Fin. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at 26.
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rive lack of basic French legal texts and documents in English. This diffi-
culty has been compounded by the substantial changes in French
corporate law during the past several years, changes resulting from both
EC regulations and internal economic conditions. These changes are
likely to continue as the EC moves toward a unified market and as the
French economy opens.
This article summarizes some of the French laws and regulations
which are pertinent for an American company seeking to enter France or
acquire a French company. The purpose of this summary is to provide a
conceptual framework for those considering entry into the French mar-
ket, while also providing a basic understanding for companies deciding
how to structure an investment in France.
II. THE FRENCH COMPANY - FORMS OF ORGANIZATION
French business organizations are principally governed by the Com-
mercial and Civil Codes, particularly Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 19668
and Decree No. 67-236 of March 23, 1967.1 France is also in the process
of harmonizing its corporate law with various EC directives, a process
which can be expected to continue.
There are two principle French business organizations: the Corpora-
tion (Socidt6 Anonyme or "SA"); and the Limited Liability Company
(Socidti d Responsabil6 Limitie or "SARL"). The relevant features of
each of these types of business organizations will be discussed below. In
addition, some alternative types of commercial enterprises will be re-
viewed. This section will conclude with an analysis of how different cor-
porate group structures can act as a barrier to or facilitate the acquisition
process.
A. § 2.01. The French Corporation - SA
An SA is an organization created for a business purpose and has at
least seven shareholders. 0 The SA is the French equivalent of the Amer-
ican corporation, and is the most common form for a business enterprise.
An SA issues shares which represent equity participation in the organiza-
tion, and shareholders generally are only liable for their capital
contributions.
8 Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.0. 26 Juillet at 6402 [hereinafter Law 66-537]. See
also BERMANN, DEVRIES & GALSTON, FRENCH LAW - CONSTITUTION AND SELECTIVE LEGISLA-
TION 24.40 (1989) (English translation in part).
9 Decree No. 67-236 of Mar. 23, 1967, [19671 J.0. 24 Mars at 2843 [hereinafter Decree 67-236].
See also BERMANN, DEVRIEs & GALsrO N, supra note 8, at 41-42.
10 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 71.
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L Incorporation of an SA
While the incorporation of an SA is a rather straightforward proce-
dure, the registration process can take between one and two months, par-
ticularly when the necessary clearance by the Treasury Department for a
foreign investment is required.'1 An SA obtains legal status only upon
registration in the Register of Commerce and Companies (Registre du
Commerce et des Sociitis). 2 However, an SA is technically formed when
all of the initial shareholders sign or approve the articles of
incorporation.
a. Initial Articles of Incorporation
The articles of incorporation must include the form of the organiza-
tion (i.e., that shareholders elected to create an SA), duration (no more
than ninety-nine years), name, purpose (simple reference to "any legal,
commercial, financial or business activity" is not sufficient), registered
capital, and a declaration of the number and classes of stock.13 In addi-
tion, the articles must contain provisions relating to the management of
the SA, including the appointment of the first members of the board of
directors (conseil d'administration) or the supervisory board (conseil de
surveillance),4 the names of the senior officers, and the appointment of a
statutory auditor (commissaire aux comptes).15
b. Initial Capital
The minimum legal capital for an SA at formation is FFr 1.5 million
if the SA is making a public offering and FFr 250,000 if it is not making
11 See SIMfiON, MOQUET, BORDE & ASSOCIATES, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE § 5.02 (1989)
[hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE]; PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE 69
(1989).
12 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 5. This is an official government publication. A registration
number may be obtained from the Clerk of the Commercial Court of the department where the SA
has its registered office (siige social).
13 Id. at art. 2.
14 For the differences between a board of directors and a supervisory board see infra notes 24-28
and 36-40 and accompanying text.
1 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at arts. 88 and 98. The role of the statutory auditor in France is far
more supervisory than that of the independent public accountant in the American company. For
example, the statutory auditor's functions include verifying the accuracy of the company's financial
statements, while also ensuring the proper functioning of the corporation and the equal treatment of
shareholders. Id. at art. 228. See generally Tunc, The French Commissaires aux Comptes, 1984 J.
Bus. L. 279 (1984); DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 5.02. However, at least one
recent authoritative voice has claimed that despite these auditors, "the statutory accounts of some
[French] companies are frequently regarded as unreliable or misleading in terms of the UK concept
of 'true and fair view,' even though the equivalent of that ("immagefidele") is now a French legal
requirement." TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 10.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:484(1991)
such an offering.' 6 Declaration of the number of shares and the par value
per share is fixed by the articles of incorporation. 7 Similarly, where
there are separate classes of stock issued by the SA, the rights and privi-
leges of each class concerning, at a minimum, dividend, voting power,
and liquidation preferences, must be stated in the articles.'"
2. Corporate Governance Issues
French corporate law allows an SA to choose between either of the
two fundamental alternative western methods of corporate governance:
a one-tier system led by a board of directors (conseil d'administration) as
is common in the United States' 9 or the two-tiered system patterned after
the German model.20 The characteristics and distinctions of each
method are discussed below.
a. Single-Tier System
The traditional single-tier system provides for the SA to be adminis-
tered by a board of directors composed of between three and fifteen mem-
bers.2" A director must also be a shareholder of the SA,22 and directors
may be removed (with or without cause) by a simple majority vote of the
shareholders23.
. Role of the Board of Directors
The board of directors has full power to direct the affairs of the
SA.24 Decisions are taken by a majority vote of the directors, and at least
16 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 71. Generally, SAs do not make a public offering at the time
of formation.
17 Id. at art. 268.
18 Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at art. 55.
19 Prior to the adoption of Law 66-537, companies in France were governed by a board of direc-
tors. For a discussion of the effects of Law 66-537 on this tradition see Will, Recent Modification in
the French Law of Commercial Companies, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 980 (1969).
20 See Law 66-537, supra note 8, at arts. 89, 117-118. See Will, supra note 19, at 982-90.
21 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 89. However, an SA not listed on a stock exchange may not
have more than twelve directors. Id. The articles may also provide that a number of directors (not
to exceed one-third of the entire board) are to be elected by the employees. Id. at art. 97. These
directors are in addition to, and are not counted for purposes of, determining the number of directors
required by law. Id
22 Id. at art. 95. A director not owning shares at the time of his/her election must acquire shares
within three months of the election or he/she is deemed to have automatically resigned his/her
position. Id.
23 Id. Removal of a director without cause will only subject a corporation to liability if the
removal was done with an unlawful or harmful intent. See DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note
11, at § 5.02.
24 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 89.
490
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half of the board must be physically present for a quorum.25 While the
board has the general authority to take any action not prohibited by the
SA's articles,26 certain matters are within the exclusive authority of the
board27 . These matters include the calling of shareholder meetings, the
preparation and review of financial statements, the preparation of an an-




The principal officer of an SA is the president (prisident du conseil
d'administration or P.D.G.). The president must be a member of the
board of directors, and the president's term of office runs concurrently
with the president's term as a director.29 The president is responsible for
the daily management of the SA.30 In addition, the president may be
dismissed without cause, 31 and may request the board's appointment of a
general manager (directeur gdndral) to assist the president 32.
b. Two-Tier System
The alternative method for governing an SA is a two-tier system
patterned after the German model of corporate governance.33 The pur-
pose of the two-tier system is to separate the management of the SA from
the supervision of management.34 In the two-tier system, the SA is man-
25 Id. at art. 100. Directors not present are deemed to have voted against any proposed resolu-
tion. Id. While a director may grant a proxy to another director for a specific vote, the granting of




28 Id. at arts. 110, 158. See generally DOING BusINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 5.02.
29 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 110.
30 Id. at art. 113.
31 Id. at art. 110. Any provision, either in the articles or in an employment contract, which
limits a board's right to dismiss the president is deemed unenforceable. Id.
32 Id. at art. 115. An SA is limited to one general manager if its capital is less than FFr 500,000;
two general managers if its capital is between FFr 500,000 and FFr 10 million; and five general
managers if it has capital in excess of FFr 10 million, provided that three of the five general manag-
ers are administrators.
33 Id. at arts. 118-150. For a review contrasting the French and German systems see Grossfield,
Management and Control of Marketable Share Companies, 13 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMP. L. 6-
28 (1972). The alternative system was adopted, at least in part, to assist in the unification of EC
corporate law. See Andres, Legal Aspects of Marketing Computer Software in France, 3 SOFTWARE
L.J. 21, 58-59 (1989); Will, supra note 19, at 985-90.
34 The two-tier system is becoming increasingly popular among French companies, particularly
those considering a restructuring of management. For example, Cie Financiere de Paribas, the
French banking giant, adopted a two-tier system in response to its failed bid to acquire Cie de Navi-
gation Mixte and the accompanying criticism of the company's management. See Browning &
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aged by a directorate (le directoire), which exercises all corporate powers
and is under the supervision (contrdle) of a supervisory board (le conseil
de surveillance).35
L The Supervisory Board
The principal task of the supervisory board is to oversee the actions
of the directorate.36 In order to accomplish this task, the board must
receive regular reports from the directorate on the SA's operations,37 re-
ceive and review an annual report and supporting documents from the
directorate, and present annually to the shareholders its observations on
the SA's operations and the directorate's functioning38. The supervisory
board has plenary authority to conduct such verifications and audits as it
deems necessary to conduct its oversight fumctions.39 The supervisory
board names the members of the directorate, and appoints the director-
ate's president.'
iL The Directorate
The members of the directorate oversee the daily operations of the
SA.41 The directorate's power is limited only by provisions in the articles
and the SA's corporate purpose.42 The directorate is limited to seven
members,43 and a person can be a member of no more than two director-
ates'. A director's term of office may be between two and six years, and
Echikson, Paribas Stung by Failed Takeover Bid is Preparing a Management Shake-up, Wall Street
Journal, March 27, 1990, at A17.
35 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 119. An SA must inform the public that it is governed by a
two-tier system by having the following announcement on all publications: Socidtd annoyme rigie
par les articles 118 d 150 de la loi sur les socidtds commerciales (corporation governed by articles 118-
150 of the law on commercial corporations). See Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at art. 56.
36 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 128. The supervisory board appoints one of its members as
president. Id. at art. 138.
37 Id. The directorate must make reports, at a minimum, on a quarterly basis. Id.
38 Id. at art. 128.
39 Id. at art. 128. A member of the supervisory board must also be a shareholder, and cannot be
a member of the directorate. Id. at arts. 130, 133.
40 Id. at art. 120. The supervisory board also approves the issuance of guarantees for the SA,
and must approve a total or partial transfer of the SA's shares or real estate. Id. at art. 128.
41 Id. at art. 124.
42 Id. Any limitations imposed upon the directorate by the articles are enforceable only by
shareholders or the supervisory board, and not by third parties. Id
43 If the SA is not a public company, the directorate can contain no more than five members,
while if the SA has capital of less than FFr 1 million, then a single director (Directeur Gdniral
Unique) may be appointed. Id at arts. 119-120.
44 A director must receive the authorization of his/her supervisory board before accepting an
appointment to a second directorate. Id. at art. 127.
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where not specified in the articles, is four years. 45 A director may be
removed with or without cause only by the shareholders upon the recom-
mendation of the supervisory board.41 While the directorate takes deci-
sions only upon majority vote, the president has exclusive authority to
deal with third parties.47
3. Liability of Officers and Directors
In France, director liability is based primarily on the concept of neg-
ligence or mismanagement. 8 Article 244 of Law 66-537 subjects direc-
tors and officers of an SA to civil liability if there is a violation of law or
an act taken which is contrary to the SA's articles, or for faults commit-
ted during their management.49 Officers and directors are jointly and
severally liable (solidairement) to the corporation and/or third parties for
any damages or losses resulting from such actions.5 0 A shareholder may
bring an action either individually or derivatively on behalf of the corpo-
ration," and a shareholder vote attempting to limit or remove director
liability is presumptively invalid52 . While the liability of a member of the
supervisory board may be more limited because of the member's limited
role in directing the SA's affairs, 3 the general manager of an SA may be
subject to the same liability as a director, and is personally liable for any
acts of mismanagement for which the general manager was personally
responsible 54.
Article 244 has been strongly criticized because of its chilling effect
on managerial risk-taking.55 As one commentator stated, "[i]t is hard to
imagine a situation where a direct loss resulting from the violation of an
applicable text would not be covered by [Article 244]. " 56
45 Id. at art. 122.
46 Id. at art. 121.
47 Id. at art. 126. However, the articles may permit the supervisory board to appoint general
managers to also represent the SA in its dealings with third parties. Id.
48 See Berger, Exporting the TWin Towers" The Development of a Transnational Business Judg-
ment Rule, 4 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 169 (1990); Paris Colloquium on Corporate Governance,
reprinted in 6 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MRXTS. L. 199 (1984) [hereinafter Paris Colloquium].
49 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 244.
50 Id.
51 Id at art. 245; see also Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at art. 200. The statute of limitations for
a shareholder action is three years. Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 247.
52 Id. at art. 246.
53 Id. at art. 250. Thus, the liability of a supervisory board is limited to its failure to properly
supervise management or to disclose to shareholders any personal knowledge it may have of crimes
or serious mismanagement. Id
54 Id. at art. 244.
55 Berger, supra note 48, at 175-76; Paris Colloquium, supra note 48, at 257-80.
56 MILLER, France, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 7-
33, 34 (H. Bloomenthal ed. 1989).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:484(1991)
French corporate law can also subject officers and directors to crimi-
nal liability. Corporate actions which can result in criminal liability in-
clude the declaration of an improper or unauthorized dividend, the
creation of fraudulent financial statements, or the failure to prepare (or
cause to be prepared) proper financial statements for the annual report.57
4. Mandatory Disclosures
The disclosures required from an SA vary both with the SA's size
and whether or not the SA is a public company.
a. Information Available to Shareholders
Certain information concerning the SA's financial and operating re-
sults must be made available to shareholders, regardless of the SA's size.
This information includes the SA's balance sheets, income statements,
salaries of its highest paid employees, and any reports of management or
the SA's statutory auditors.5" All of this information must cover the past
three fiscal years.59
Shareholders holding at least ten percent of an SA's registered capi-
tal have a right to additional information in two different ways. 6° First,
twice a year these shareholders may submit written questions to the pres-
ident concerning any matter involving the continued operation of the
SA.61 The president must respond in writing to these questions within
one month of receipt.62
Second, ten percent of the shareholders may obtain an order from
the Commercial Court appointing an expert to prepare a report on one or
more aspects of the SA's operation.63 The report can be on any issue
which concerns the corporation, and the court can order that the SA pay
for the report. 4 Upon completion, the report must be sent to, among
57 See, ag., Law 66-537, supra note 8, at arts. 437-39. Violation of these provisions may result in
up to five years imprisonment. Id.
58 Id. at art. 170; see also DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 5.02.
59 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 170. Shareholders may also obtain lists of the board of
directors or supervisory board during this period, the attendance sheets and minutes of any share-
holders meeting, and a certified copy of the articles. Id. at arts. 153, 168 and 170.
60 For a more general discussion of the role of a substantial minority shareholder under French
Law see Tunc, The Minority Expert in French Company Law, 1984 J. Bus. L. 83 (1984).
61 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 226.
62 Id. A holder of less than ten percent of stock may, pursuant to the rules of civil procedure,
obtain a judicial order allowing for limited discovery on an issue before the initiation of litigation, or
in a summary proceeding (sur requite ou en refdre) to determine if litigation is warranted. C. PR.
Civ., at art. 145.
63 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 226.
64Id.
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others, the petitioning shareholder, the SA's statutory auditor, and (if
appropriate) the public prosecutor. 65 The report must also be attached
to and published with the annual report or notice to shareholders of the
next annual meeting.66
b. Additional Disclosures Required of Certain Companies
Additional periodic filing requirements are mandated for companies
having a net turnover (i.e,, sales minus taxes and rebates) of more than
FFr 120 million or more than 300 employees.6 These disclosures must
be reviewed and approved by the board of directors or supervisory
board.68 It is expected that these disclosure provisions will be applied to
an increasing number of corporations, particularly in light of disclosure
requirements presently being considered by the European Economic
Community.69
c. Additional Disclosures for Public Companies
All public corporations must publish their annual financial state-
ments (including profit statements, loss statements, and consolidated fi-
nancial statements) and portfolio holdings within four months after the
end of the company's fiscal year.7' A public company must also provide
quarterly disclosures of its net turnover during the proceeding quarter,
and biannual profit and loss statements for the previous six month
period.7 1
B. § 2.02. The Limited Liability Company- SARL
An SARL is an organization created for a business purpose which
must have at least two and not more than fifty shareholders. 72 Share-
holders of an SARL are liable only to the extent of their capital contribu-
tions. An SARL is commonly used by small or newly formed companies
because it offers limited liability for shareholders while also allowing for
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at art. 244.
68 Id. If the statements appear unreasonable, the statutory auditor must, within one month of
receipt, prepare a report for the board. This report must be provided to shareholders at the next
annual meeting. Id.
69 See DOING BusINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 5.02.
70 See Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at arts. 294-97. Companies must also state whether or not
the accounts have been verified by the statutory auditor. Id.
71 Id. This information may be obtained from the Companies and Commercial Registry.
72 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 36. A special type of SARL, an Entreprise Unipersonelle d
ResponsibilitdLimitde ("EURL") can be created with only one shareholder. See infra notes 109-114
and accompanying text.
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a streamlined corporate governance structure.
73
L Creation and Purpose of an SARL
The incorporation of an SARL is similar in process (and time) to an
SA.74 Thus, an SARL is technically formed when the initial sharehold-
ers sign the articles of incorporation, but does not obtain legal recogni-
tion until it is registered in the Register of Commerce and Companies. 7
a. Initial Articles of Incorporation
The initial articles may include any provisions pertaining to corpo-
rate governance as the shareholders choose, including methods for select-
ing a managing director, shareholder voting, and limiting the sale or
transfer of shares.76 The initial articles must contain, 77 at a minimum,
the name, purpose,78 duration,79 registered office, and registered capital 0
of the SARL.
b. Initial Capital
The minimum legal capital for an SARL at formation is FFr
50,000."8 The capital of an SARL is divided into shares with a minimum
par value of FFr 100.82 An SARL cannot make a public offering of its
shares, and is prohibited from issuing negotiable securities.
83
2. Corporate Governance Issues
An SARL is governed by two principal bodies: a managing director
(girant) and the shareholders. The duties and responsibilities of each
group are summarized below.
73 The SARL was introduced into France in 1925, and was based upon the German Gesellschaft
mit beschrdnkter Haftung [GmbH]. As of 1985 there were approximately 430,000 SARLs versus
approximately 270,000 SAs in France. Andres, supra note 33, at 54-55.
74 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
75 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 5.
76 Id. at arts. 49-51 and 59.
77 See generally id. at arts. 2, 38; DOING BusINss IN FRANcE, supra note 11, at § 5.03.
78 As with an SA, reference to "any legal, commercial, financial or business activity" is not
sufficient. In addition, there are certain businesses which an SARL may not conduct. See Law 66-
537, supra note 8, at art. 490.
79 The maximum duration of an SARL is ninety-nine years. Id at art. 2.
80 See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
81 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 35.
82 Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at art. 21.
83 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at arts. 42-43.
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a. Managing Director
The managing director oversees the daily operations of the SARL.84
Full authority is given to the managing director85 to bind the SARL in its
dealings with third parties,86 even though the managing director does not
have to be a shareholder of the SARL87. The managing director is ap-
pointed either in the articles or by simple majority vote of the sharehold-
ers,88 and may be removed at any time, with or without cause, by
majority vote89. However, managing directors removed without cause
may bring a suit for wrongful termination against the SARL.90 Finally,
it is important to include in the articles a provision limiting the time
period a managing director is appointed for; absent such a provision, a
managing director is appointed for the life of the SARL. 9'
b. Shareholders
Shareholders have ultimate power over the SARL because, unlike
the SA 92 (or the American corporation), there is no intermediary body
between the manager(s) and shareholders. A shareholder meeting must
be held within six months of the close of the fiscal year, at which time
shareholders will receive the general manager's report on the SARL's
operations and financial statements (including balance sheets, assets and
liabilities, and income statements) for the previous year.93 Decisions can
be made by shareholders representing more than one-half the SARL's
capital, and if a majority is not obtained then a second meeting is held at
which decisions are adopted by a simple majority of the votes cast, re-
gardless of the number of shares present or represented.94
84 Id at arts. 13-14 and 49.
85 A managing director must be a natural person and cannot be a legal entity (Le., another
SARL). Id. at art. 49.
86 The articles may limit this authority by, for example, requiring certain types ofdecisions to be
voted upon by shareholders. Id. However, third parties may hold the SARL liable for agreements
entered into with the managing director, even if the articles limited the managing director's power to
take such action, unless it is shown that the third party knew of this limitation. Id.
87 Id. In contrast, the President of an SA must be a shareholder. See supra notes 21-22 and 29
and accompanying text.
88 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 49. This majority requirement may be increased in the
articles. Id. at art. 55.
89 Id This majority vote requirement may also be increased.
90 Id.
91 Id. at art. 49. See generally Rawlings, French Company Law: Choice of Corporate Forn Avail-
able to the Foreign Investor, 30 Bus. LAW. 1251 (1975).
92 For a discussion of the SA see supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
93 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 56.
94 Id. at art. 59. However, the shareholders may amend the articles to prevent decisions from
being taken without a quorum present.
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i. Shareholder Action by Written Consent
The SARL's articles may provide that any shareholder action (ex-
cept for the approval of the general manager's statement of operations
and financial statements provided at the annual meeting) may be taken
by written consent (consultation 6crite).95 Resolutions considered by this
method are approved on the same basis as if they were presented to
shareholders at an annual meeting.96
iE Extraordinary Shareholder Meetings
Extraordinary shareholder meetings are held when necessary to
amend the SARL's articles.9 7 Decisions taken at an extraordinary gen-
eral meeting require the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the SARL's
capital.98
3. Liability of Officers
As with the officers and directors of an SA, 99 the managing director
of the SARL may be subject to significant liability for certain acts of
mismanagement or for violations of the law or the SARL's articles"° . A
managing director may also be held criminally liable for declaring divi-
dends when the SARL has insufficient profits or for providing fraudulent
or inaccurate financial statements to shareholders.' 01
4. Comparison Between an SA and an SARL
An SARL is typically chosen as the investment vehicle for smaller
businesses, start-up ventures or family-owned businesses. Some particu-
lar advantages of an SARL over an SA include simpler management
structure (i.e., management of an SARL may be entrusted to a single
managing director, and shareholder action may be taken by written con-
sent), a lower minimum amount of registered capital for incorporation
(FFr 50,000 for an SARL versus FFr 250,000 for a private SA), and an
95 Id. at art. 59.
96 Id. at arts. 59-60. The articles may also impose "super-majority" requirements on such ac-
tion. For the technical requirements necessary for any such solicitation see Decree 67-236, supra
note 9, at arts. 40-42.
97 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 60.
98 Id. A provision in the articles requiring a higher percentage of approval is void. Id. Certain
actions taken at extraordinary meetings, including the sale of stock to third parties or an increase in
shareholder liability, may require additional majority or even unanimous approval of the sharehold-
ers. See, e.g., id. at arts. 45, 60. See generally DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 5.03.
99 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
10o Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 52. For example, liability may be imposed for certain self-
dealing transactions, waste of assets or corporate funds, and failure to pay required dividends.
101 See id. at arts. 423-31.
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SARL may be incorporated with only one shareholder, while an SA re-
quires at least seven. In addition, an SARL does not have to appoint a
statutory auditor unless it meets certain size requirements, while an SA
must appoint a statutory auditor at the time of incorporation and must
have two such auditors if it is a public company required to publish con-
solidated financial statements.10 2
In contrast, an SA is commonly used by larger organizations, and
has more status within France. The advantages of an SA are primarily
the result of the fact that SAs are created for large organizations. Some
advantages of the SA over the SARL include the ease with which shares
of an SA may be transferred or purchased, 03 the SA's ability to issue
negotiable securities or debentures which may not be issued by an
SARL,104 and the ease with which changes in management may be
made. 105
5. Converting the SARL into an SA
Transforming an SARL into an SA is a relatively simple process.
Assuming the prerequisites for the formation of an SA are satisfied 0 6
and that the SARL has had its financial statements properly reviewed
and approved for the prior two fiscal years, an SARL may be converted
into an SA if approved by shareholders controlling three-fourths of the
SARL's capital 07. The newly converted SA would then have the au-
thority to exchange the non-negotiable shares of the old SARL for nego-
tiable securities.108
102 SARLs must appoint statutory auditors if two of the following three tests are satisfied: they
have assets of more than FFr 10 million; pre-tax turnover of more than FFr 20 million; or more than
fifty employees. See Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 64; Decree 67-236, supra note 9, at arts. 12, 43.
103 For example, shares of an SARL normally may not be sold or transferred to third parties
without the prior approval of shareholders holding at least three-fourths of the SARL's capital. See
Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 45. SAs are not subject to this prohibition unless it is specifically
stated in their articles. In addition, an SARL may entirely prohibit the sale or transfer of shares, a
right the SA does not have. See id. at art. 47. Finally, the sale of shares of an SARL is subject to a
4.8% registration tax, while the sale of an SA's shares are generally not subject to this tax.
104 See id at arts. 42-43.
105 For example, the general manager of the SARL may maintain an action for damages if his/
her dismissal was for other than good issue, while an SA's officers have no such right.
106 The three most important are a minimum of seven shareholders, capital of at least FFr
250,000, and shares with a par value of FFr 100.
107 Only a simple majority of the SARL's capital is required if the SARL has a net asset value in
excess of FFr 5 million. See id. at arts. 60, 69.
108 Id. at art. 449.
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C. § 2.03. Alternative Commercial Structures" 9
While the SA and the SARL are the two most common forms of
business enterprise, there are a number of other alternative forms of
French business organizations which may be useful for the foreign inves-
tor. The three most significant are the Single Shareholder Limited Lia-
bility Company (Enterprise Unipersonelle d Responsibilitd Limitde or
"EURL"), the General Partnership (Socidt6 en Nom Collectif or
"SNC"l10), and the Economic Interest Group (Groupement d'Intdrift
Economique or "GIE"). The salient features of each of these forms of
organization are outlined below.111
L EURL
An EURL is considered to be a special type of SARL because it has
only one shareholder. 1 2 An EURL is subject to all of the regulations
applicable to an SARL unless the regulation explicitly provides other-
wise.113 The primary differences between an SARL and an EURL is that
the sole shareholder controlling the EURL may not grant proxies or
delegate power, and all decisions made by the sole shareholder must be
recorded pursuant to statutory requirements.'
1 4
2. SNC
An SNC is the French equivalent of the American partnership.
Partners of the SNC are jointly and severally liable for the SNC's debts,
the SNC is not subject to corporate income tax, and the SNC does not
have to publicly release its financial results."1 5 An SNC is typically used
109 In addition to commercial organizations, it is important to note that certain profit-seeking
activities are considered "civil" in nature, and thus may be operated through a civil company
(Socidtd Civile or "SC"). Such activities include law firms, some types of real estate syndications, and
other non-commercial activities. See generally DOING BusINEss IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at
§ 5.01 (discussing differences between civil and commercial activities).
110 Limited partnerships (Socidtds en commandite par actions or "SCA") have also gained in pop-
ularity in recent years, largely as a result of their virtual immunity from takeover bids. Thus, such
well-known companies as Hermes, EuroDisneyland and Yves Saint-Laurent have recently selected
the SCA form of organization. However, an existing company which wishes to modify its articles to
become an SCA must give existing shareholders the right to "opt-out," thereby creating significant
difficulties for the company. See Law No. 89-531 of August 2, 1989, at art. 15, [1989] J.O. 4 Aout at
9822 [hereinafter Law 89-531].
111 For a more exhaustive discussion in English of these and other French corporate structures
see DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at ch. 5.
112 Single-member private companies were permitted in France only in 1985, under Law No. 85-
697 of July 11, 1985, [1985] J.O. 12 Juillet at 7862.
113 Ministerial Response [1988] J.O. Deb. A.N. 1043.
114 See Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 60.
115 Id. at art. 10.
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either for joint ventures or by investors who wish to remain anonymous.
An SNC is operated by one or more managing directors (gdrants).116
All partners are automatically managing directors and, in addition, the
managing directors may appoint other managing directors who are not
partners.117 Removal of a managing director/ partner appointed in the
articles11 requires a unanimous vote of all of the partners, and results in
automatic dissolution of the SNC unless the articles otherwise provide or
the remaining partners unanimously vote to continue the SNC'19 . Re-
moval of a non-partner managing director may be accomplished by a
simple majority vote.120 Managing directors have all of the authority
necessary to run the SNC and, while the articles may limit this authority,
any such limitation is ineffective against third parties unless the third
party has knowledge.121 As with an SA or an SARL, managing directors
may be liable for negligent mismanagement, and a non-partner managing
director may be liable for the debts of a bankrupt SNC. An SNC must
hold a partnership meeting at least annually to review and approve the
SNC's financial statements, 122 and must also have additional meetings if
presented with a proper demand from a partner 123 . However, the articles
may allow the SNC to take action by written consent. 124
3. GIE 125
The GIE is similar to a partnership in that it allows two or more
individuals 126 to join their resources to expand or increase their individ-
ual activities. The activities of a GIE are considered to be an economic
extension of its members; thus, the GIE is not a profit-seeking enterprise,
but rather attempts to allow each member to profit individually from the
116 Id. at art. 12.
117 Id. However, the SNC's articles may limit the right of partners to be managing directors or to
name non-partners as managing directors. Id. A corporation can be a managing partner.
118 Although an SNC acts like a partnership, it is a corporate entity and as such is governed by its
articles of incorporation (statuts), as are the SA and SARL. Id. at art. 2.
119 Ido at art. 18. If the partner/managing director is not named in the articles, removal still
requires a unanimous vote by the other partners but does not result in dissolution. Ido
120 Id. Removal of a managing director without cause may give rise to a cause of action for
damages. Id
121 Id. at arts. 13-14.
122 Id. at art. 16.
123 Id. at art. 15.
124 Id. Unless otherwise set forth in the articles, all resolutions require unanimous consent of the
partners for approval. Certain decisions, including the removal or appointment of new managing
directors and the transfer of partnership shares, may only be determined by a majority which the
bylaws establish. Id.
125 The GIE was created by Ordinance 67-821 of September 23, 1967 [hereinafter Ordinance 67-
821], and has rapidly gained acceptance in France and in the EEC.
126 Legal entities (L., SAs, SARLs) may form a GIE.
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efforts of the GIE.1" Typical activities for which a GIE is used include
research and development, and joint commercialization projects, such as
the Airbus Industrie consortium created by French, English and German
airline manufacturers.
A GIE is created by a contract between its members.12 It is oper-
ated by one or more managers (administrateurs),12 9 who are given au-
thority to run the GIE13 °. However, members of the GIE have plenary
powers to meet and make any or all decisions relating to the GIE.13 1 The
ability of members to withdraw and new members to join is determined
by the original contract or subsequent agreement among the members. 
132
A GIE may not issue negotiable shares, but it may issue debentures pro-
vided that all of its members are companies which may themselves issue
debentures. 133
D. § 2.04. Corporate Group Structures as a Barrier to the
Acquisition Process
As a practical matter, certain types of corporate group structures
can often impede or prevent the acquisition process. For example, cross-
ownership of shares in friendly hands can often prevent an unwanted
bidder from succeeding. 13g This section briefly outlines some structural
impediments to acquisitions in France.
1. Hardcore Shareholdings
In an attempt to protect a number of the newly privatized compa-
nies from being the targets of unwanted takeover bids, the government
127 Ordinance 67-821, supra note 125, at art. 2. Accordingly, any profits made by the GIE accrue
directly to the members. The members of the GIE are also jointly and severally liable for the debts
of the GIE. Id at art. 4.
128 Id. at art. 6.
129 Id at art. 9. Managers do not have to be members of the GIE. Id.
130 This authority may be limited by the contract which created the GIE, or by subsequent deci-
sions of the members. Id
131 Unless so specified in the GIE's contract, decisions of the members require a unanimous vote.
132 Id. at art. 7.
133 Id. at art. 5.
134 In -America, this type of cross-holding where a target (or potential target) places a block of
stock in the hands of an investor friendly to management is termed a "white squire" arrangement.
See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 140-44 (2d ed.
1988). Some recent examples of white squire arrangements include Corporate Partners' purchase of
$300 million of voting preferred stock from Polaroid during the pendency of a hostile tender offer by
Shamrock Holdings, see Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989) and
General Cinema's purchase of Carter Hawley Hale's preferred stock to defeat a takeover attempt by
The Limited, see Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal.
1984).
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sold a significant block of stock to "hardcore friendly shareholders"
(noyau dur). The noyau dur were put in place to give these privatized
companies some stability after a seven year period in which they had
been both nationalized and privatized. 135 As a result of this policy, it is
estimated that as much as twenty to thirty percent of the equity of the
larger French public companies is owned by various noyau dur.1 36 The
noyau dur had an obligation to retain these holdings, for at least two
years, and can only sell them to other similarly situated shareholders.
137
In return for their agreement to be long-term friendly investors, the
noyau dur obtain, in effect, a blocking control position for only a small
premium above the (low) initial offering price. 138
The use of noyau dur has been successful. As one knowledgeable
source commented, "a lot of companies have got to the point where 30%,
40%, 50% of the company is in friendly hands." '139 However, the policy
is also coming under increasing criticism, particularly as Europeans at-
tempt to enter the French market through acquisitions. In addition, as
the time period that companies were privatized increases, the less the
justification for noyau dur exists. 140
Finally, it is worth noting that noyau dur could potentially result in
a substantial block of stock being in unfriendly hands. The French gov-
ernment has previously considered attempting to break down the noyau
dur, and while the government considered allowing the shares to be
transferred as a block to new "friendly" shareholders, such friendly
shareholders have been known to turn hostile. 141
135 See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
136 See TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 15. Some companies which have noyau dur
shareholders include Paribas, which has a stable group of seventeen shareholders, and the French
television channel, TFI, which has eighteen. For a recent listing of nine large French companies and
their noyau dur see Jacquillat, Nationalization and Privatization in Contemporary France, Gov't
Union Rev. 21, 46 (1987).
137 TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 15.
138 Jacquillat, supra note 136, at 41-5. The average initial returns on French privatized compa-
nies were substantially higher (with a smaller risk given the operating history of these companies)
than ordinary initial public offerings. See generally id.
139 Evans, France's M&A Quandary, EUROMONEY, March 3, 1989, at 21 (quoting William Lee,
Managing Partner in the Paris office of the law firm Shearman & Sterling).
140 See, eg., Jonqui~res, The Break With the French Tradition, Fin. Times, Jan. 17, 1990, § 1, at
24.
141 While Law No. 89-465 of July 10, 1989, J.O. July 11, 1989 at 8671, empowers the Ministry of
Economy to block the acquisition by an investor seeking to acquire more than 10% of a privatized
company if warranted by the protection of "national interests," the authority will lapse as of January
1, 1993. In America, a most notable example of a friendly shareholder turning unfriendly occurred
when Warner, in response to a threatened takeover by Rupert Murdoch, sold a 19 percent equity
interest to Chris-Craft. See News International Ple v. Warner Communications, Inc., No. 7420 (Jan.
12, 1984) (LEXIS, Del. library, Delch file). Chris-Craft's President, Herb Siegel, eventually became
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2. Cross-Holdings
Many SAs are generally thought to be controlled by a relatively
small number of shareholders. One estimate suggests that up to fifty-
seven percent of the 200 largest public and private French industrial and
commercial companies are controlled by family groups, with this per-
centage being even higher for small companies.142 It is not uncommon
for French companies to attempt to sell a large block of stock to a
friendly investor, such as a company's key supplier or the company's
bank. These alliances can include significant cross-shareholdings, or the
issuance of stock warrants or options to allies which can be converted to
common (or even super-voting) stock in the event that a takeover offer
for the issuer company is announced.
143
A variation of this cross-holding technique is a company's use of a
subsidiary as a holding company to hold up to ten percent of the parent
company's stock. The practice, termed "auto-contrdle," is widely used in
France by such well-known companies as Pernot-Ricard, Paribas and
CGE, the French telecommunications and electronic company. Auto-
contrdle has been described as "capitalism without capital," and has been
widely criticized within France.'"
3. Use of Super- Voting Stock
Another way that French companies may seek to maintain control
in friendly hands is to separate voting rights from shareholdings. For
example, French law allows the articles of an SA to increase the voting
a major critic of Warner Chairman Steven Ross, a fact which influenced Warner's decision to merge
with Time. In France, a similar situation can be found in the battle for control over Moet Hennessy
Louis Vuitton (LVMH), where Bernard Arnault was originally invited onto the LVMH Board and
became a large shareholder at the request of LVMH's former Chairman, Henry Racamier, only to
turn against Racamier and seek control of LVMH. See, eg., Graham, Champagne War Bubbles
Over, Fin. Times, November14, 1989, § 1, at 29. Arnault eventually was successful in this battle.
See Greenhouse, Vuitton's Chief Quits, Ending a Bitter Feud, N. Y. Times, April 27, 1990, at Dl, col
4.
142 TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 15.
143 Id. at 16. For example, the large French food company BSN recently issued bonds with
warrants convertible into common stock in the event of an unfriendly offer in an attempt to dilute
the holding of any unfriendly party. Similarly, Soci6te G6n6rale used an alliance of shareholders to
prevent an unwanted acquisition. See Evans, supra note 139, at 20-21.
144 Id; see generally Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 359. Paribas' subsidiary, Bancaire, owns 6
percent of its parent, while Pernod-Ricard's subsidiary controls 10 percent. However, under re-
cently adopted legislation, after July 1, 1991 a target may not vote shares owned by companies that
are directly or indirectly controlled by the target. See infra notes 228-46 and accompanying text.
Thus, it is anticipated that the "auto-contrdle" practice will largely disappear as a result of this
legislation.
Mergers and Acquisitions in France
11:484(1991)
rights of long-term shareholders. 141 This ensures that long-term share-
holders, generally friendly to management, have increased control over
the company. 146
SAs may also issue up to twenty-five percent of their capital as
either non-voting preferred stock (actions d dividende prioritaire sans
droit de vote) or investment certificates (certificat d'investissement) where
the voting rights associated with these certificates are issued separately to
existing shareholders and are subject to significant transfer restric-
tions.1 47 Non-voting preferred stock must have preference in terms of
receiving dividends and liquidation rights over the common stock.148
Finally, it is possible, though officially discouraged, for a company
to put an absolute limit on the amount of voting power of any one share-
holder. For example, Pernod-Ricard limits a shareholder from control-
ling more than thirty percent of the voting rights of the company,
regardless of the number of shares held. 149
4. Conclusion
One authority has claimed that, as a result of the use of various
structures to place control in friendly hands, "relatively few listed com-
panies are in fact susceptible to a takeover without the agreement of
management or a restricted group of dominant shareholders."15 In ad-
dition, where an acquisition is proposed by a foreign-owned entity, par-
ticularly when controlled by non-EC investors, the French target may
persuade the government to delay the necessary approval of the transac-
tion to allow the target to find a "French solution."' 151 Yet these struc-
tures are changing, and the French market is becoming increasingly
145 Law 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 175. For example, shareholders may resolve in an extraordi-
nary general meeting (requiring a two-thirds majority of the votes of shareholders present or repre-
sented) to provide for double voting rights of shares held for at least two years by the same
shareholder. Id.
146 Major public companies, such as Piper-Heidseck, Peugeot and LVMH have this type of provi-
sion in their articles.
147 The regulations concerning the issuance of non-voting preferred stock are at id at art. 269.
The issuing of investment certificates is covered at id at art. 283. The transfer restrictions prevent
the voting certificate from being transferred except to a holder of another investment certificate. Id
148 Id. at art. 269. If dividends are not paid over three years, then non-voting preferred share-
holders gain the right to vote without losing the right to preferred dividends. Id
149 See generally Takeovers in the EC, supra note 4; see also, France, in TAKEOVERS AND MERG-
ERS IN EUROPE (1988) (monograph published by the law firm Clifford Chance) [hereinafter, TAKE-
OVERS AND MERGERS].
150 See TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 17.
151 In most instances, the French target seeks a white squire willing to top the offer, as in the case
of the counter-offer by Martini& Rossi for Benedictine. See generally Kiernan, Bedos, & d'Ornano,
The Regulations Governing Mergers and Acquisitions Across the European Community: France, 1989
INT'L FIN. L. REv. 26 (March 1989).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:484(1991)
open. This openness is likely to continue, particularly as some of the
larger nationalized French companies are privatized, and in response to
the demands by other EEC companies and American investors for recip-
rocal openness as French companies make purchases abroad.152
III. THE FRENCH SECURITIES MARKET
Since the mid-1980s, successive French governments have taken sig-
nificant steps in an effort to modernize the French securities market and
in an attempt to make Paris the leading stock exchange on the European
continent. As a result of these steps and the selling of formerly national-
ized companies to investors at a highly favorable price, the Paris stock
exchange (the Bourse) is now second (behind the London Exchange) as
the most active European market in terms of companies listed.15 3 The
French stock market has reached record levels, increasing more than
twenty percent over its high prior to the October 1987 market decline. It
is expected that the French securities market will continue to grow, and
the government will strongly support this growth.
A. § 3.01. Regulatory Authorities in France
1. The Stock Exchange Commission (Commission des Opirations de
Bourse or "COB")
The COB is the principal organization regulating securities transac-
tions in France. The COB was established in 1967,154 modeled largely
upon the United States' Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC")15 5 . One significant difference between the COB and the SEC,
however, is that in addition to its regulatory duties, the COB was given
the responsibility for developing and expanding the French securities
market.156
152 An example of the criticism against French barriers is the report in TAKEOVERS IN THE EC,
supra note 4, at § 4.
153 See id. at 12; Hawawini, Financial Innovation and Recent Developments in the French Capital
Markets, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 145 (1987).
154 Ordinance 67-833 of September 28, 1967, [1967] J.O. 29 Septembre at 9589. [hereinafter Ordi-
nance 67-833].
155 The COB's establishment and development is reviewed in Bordeaux-Groult, Problems of En-
forcement and Cooperation In the Multinational Securities Market: A French Perspective, 9 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 453 (1987).
156 See Ordinance 67-833, supra note 154, at art. 1. The COB was given this responsibility be-
cause French authorities believed that enhanced investor confidence would encourage desired
growth and broaden the investor base. Previously, the French Securities markets had been subject to
serious abuses. See generally Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 155, at 453.
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a. Recent Legislation
In August, 1989, the French legislature adopted a law reorganizing
and increasing the power of the COB.' 5 7 The law strengthens the inde-
pendence of the COB by providing it with the authority to determine its
own budget within legally authorized limits.15 The COB is also no
longer subject to financial supervision by the Ministry of Economics and
Finance. 159
The legislation also expanded the COB's governing body (Colldge de
la COB) to include eight instead of five members; a president, appointed
by the government for a non-renewable term of six years; a member ap-
pointed by the governor of the Bank of France; three members, one each
appointed by the Presidents of the Council of State, Supreme Court, and
the Audit Office ("Cour des Comptes"); and three industry regulatory
representatives. 160
The COB is organized into five principal divisions: (i) inspection,
responsible for market surveillance of trading, (including insider trading
investigations) and contacts with the stock exchanges; (ii) accounting,
which reviews financial statements of reporting companies and handles
contacts with auditors; (iii) legal, which receives complaints concerning
operations on the exchanges, and investigates possible violations of law
resulting from these complaints; (iv) investment, regulating the activities
of mutual funds and real estate companies; and (v) information, which
approves prospectuses and handles the listing and de-listing of
securities. 161
b. Investigative and Enforcement Authority
The COB has investigative and enforcement authority. It may, after
157 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at 9822. Law89-531 also modified the laws governing tender
offers (offrespubliques d'achat), particularly the disclosure requirements for bidders. See infra notes
217-224 and accompanying text.
158 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 12.
159 Id.; see also France Securities Bill Becomes Law, 2 Doing Business In Europe (CCH)
98,315 (Nov. 1989) (providing English summary of the regulations) [hereinafter France: Securities
Bill]; See generally Lee, French Rules On Tender Offers, Fin. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, § 1 (Business
Law), at 45.
160 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 1. These members serve four-year terms which can be
renewed once. See generally Lee, supra note 159, at 45. Law 89-531 has eliminated the presence of a
specific governmental representative (Commissaire du Gouvernment) in an effort to cut the "umbili-
cal cord" with the Minister of Economy.
161 See generally Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 155, at 453-60. The COB's disciplinary powers
have been expanded to cover managers of mutual funds. Law89-53 1, supra note 110, at art. 37. In
addition, this legislation provides for the creation of a new disciplinary council for managers of
mutual funds. Id.
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obtaining an appropriate court order, require that all of a company's as-
sets be placed into an escrow account and obtain the equivalent of a pre-
liminary injunction (interdiction temporaire d'activitJ professionelle),
temporarily preventing a company from engaging in business. 162 It has
investigatory power to conduct searches and seize documents, and broad
authority to conduct discovery.163
The COB has authority to levy fines of up to FFr ten million or ten
times the profit realized from the illegal activities, whichever is
greater.6 The COB also may issue orders to cease an activity in viola-
tion of its rules.' 65
c. Duties and Responsibilities
The COB has three primary functions. First, it regulates and super-
vises the various French exchanges and French brokers. 166 In this capac-
ity, it promulgates rules and regulations concerning the functioning of
the exchanges and related activities, including the buying and selling of
shares. 67 Second, it reviews and verifies information disclosed to the
public by reporting companies. 6s Finally, the COB is responsible for
policing the exchanges and ensuring that companies listed on the ex-
changes disclose the requisite information.
169
2. The Stock Exchange Council (Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs or
"CB V")
The CBV, while more limited in authority than the COB, has gen-
eral legislative and judicial decision-making authority over the stock ex-
changes. The CBV must also approve the listing or removal of a
162 Id. at art. 5. This authority was significantly expanded by the new legislation.
163 Id. at art. 2. Anyone not cooperating with a COB investigation may face criminal liability.
Id. at art. 6. In addition, persons who otherwise might be able to claim immunity from the require-
ment to disclose certain information because of the French law on secrecy have no right to such a
privilege against the COB. See generally Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 155, at 456-57.
164 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 5. This figure is reduced by any fines levied in a judicial
proceeding.
165 Traditionally, the COB only had the right to recommend to the public prosecutor that an
action be brought. See, e.g., Bordeaux-Groult, supra note 155, at 455-60. However, Law 89-531 has
given the COB additional enforcement powers by granting it a specific but extended injunction
power. See Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 5.
166 Ordinance 67-833, supra note 154, at art. 4.
167 Id. at art. 4. The COB also has responsibility for developing guidelines applicable to compa-
nies making public offerings, and those assisting in such offerings. Id.
168 Id at art. 3.
169 Id. The COB may require a company to publicly inform its shareholders and/or the market
of any previous disclosure violations, and if the company refuses to so act the COB may officially
inform the public as to the violation in any appropriate manner. Id.
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company's securities from a stock exchange. 170 The CBV consists of
twelve members, ten of whom are elected by stock brokers; one who is an
appointed representative for publicly listed companies; and a member ap-
pointed by the employees of stock brokers (Socidtds de Bourse) and of the
Stock Brokers Association (Socidtd des Bourses Frangaises or SBF), a spe-
cialized financial institution charged with overseeing the market's day-to-
day operations and which has executive authority over the exchanges.
17 1
The CBV also includes a government representative appointed by the
Minister of the Economy.1
72
The primary function of the CBV is to develop the rules and regula-
tions necessary for the orderly function of the exchange, and ensure the
compliance with the rules of the exchanges and the SBF.
All decisions of the CBV concerning disciplinary or regulatory is-
sues may be appealed to an administrative judge.1 73 As more fully dis-
cussed below, the CBV also has primary responsibility for analyzing the
price offered in any tender offer. 74 The CBV must determine, within five
days of a bidder's application, that the consideration provided in an offer
is acceptable and within the public interest.
1 75
B. § 3.02. The French Stock Exchanges
L Public Markets
There are three different stock markets in France: the official stock
exchange (Marchd Officiel), the second market (Second Marche) and the
over-the-counter market (Marchd Hors Cote). As in the United States,
the principal differences among these markets are the size and scope of
the issuers. The CBV decides on which of the seven French stock ex-
changes an issuer's securities are to be listed, depending upon the value
170 Decree No. 88-254 of March 17, 1988, [1988] J.0. 18 Mars at 3663. The COB must notify the
CBV of any objection to the listing within five days from the date it learns of the CBV's decision. Id
at art. 12.
171 The SBF has been delegated its authority from the CBV, and has responsibility for determin-
ing when a quotation should be interrupted or stopped. Law No. 88-70 of January 22, 1988, [1988]
J.O. 23 Janvier at 1111 [hereinafter Law 88-70].
172 Law 88-70, supra note 171, at art. 12. The CBV replaced the former Stock Brokers Commit-
tee (Chambre Syndicale des Agents de Change).
173 Id at art. 5. All other decisions by the CBV can only be appealed to the judicial court before
the court of appeals in Paris. Id; see also Decree No. 88-603 of May 7, 1988 at art. 2, [1988] J.0. 8
mai at 6606. The operating procedures of the CBV are set forth in Law 88-70, supra note 171, at
arts. 5-7. See also DOING BusINEss IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 15.04 (translation and summary
of procedures).
174 See infra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
175 Riglement General du Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs, approved by the Arr&6 of April 21,
1988, [1988] J.0. 23 Avril at 5394, at arts. 182-186. See generally infra note 220 and accompanying
text.
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of the securities to be listed, the location of the issuer's principal place of
business, and the recommendation of the Association Frangaise des So-
ci6t6 de Bourse ("A.F.S.B."), an organization representing both brokers
and the SBF. 176 The basic requirements and characteristics of each mar-
ket are summarized below.
a. The Official Stock Exchange
The Official Stock Exchange is the largest and most prestigious in
France. In order to be listed on this exchange, a company must have a
market capitalization of at least one million European currency units
("ecu") and have published its annual financial statements for the three
previous years. 177 As a general rule, at least twenty-five percent of a
company's shares must be available for sale to the public, although this
requirement may be waived where the company has sufficient capitaliza-
tion and number of shares to assure an orderly market. While the
number of domestic companies listed on the official market decreased
slightly from 1987 to 1988, market capitalization during this period in-
creased substantially.
178
b. The Second Market
The second market provides a market for the shares of companies
not large enough to be traded on the official market. Companies listed on
the second market frequently switch over to the official market after a
three- to five-year period. In 1988 there were fourteen companies listed
on the second market.
The procedures for listing on the second market are significantly less
burdensome than for a listing on the official market. In addition, only
ten percent of the company's shares must be sold to the public. 179 At the
time of listing a company must issue a prospectus, 180 and develop ac-
counting procedures which satisfy the rules governing issuers on the offi-
cial market 181. A listing on the second market is good for three years, at
the end of which the issuer may, with the approval of the CBV and fol-
176 The seven stock exchanges in France are located in Paris, Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille,
Nancy and Nantes. DOING BusINEss IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 15.04[2][c].
177 Listing on the French stock exchanges is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CBV.
See Riglement G~nral of April 21, 1988 of the Commission des Bourses de Valeurs, at title III
[hereinafter CBV Regulation of April 21]. See also COB R~glement No. 88-04 (setting forth disclo-
sure requirements for public issuers).
178 TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 40.
179 CBV Regulation of April 21, supra note 177, at art. 3.
180 The information required to be included in a prospectus is discussed infra at notes 186-187
and accompanying text.
181 CBV Regulation of April 21, supra note 177, at art. 3.
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lowing recommendation by the SBF, be listed on the Official
Exchange. 182
c. The Over-The-Counter Market
The Over-The-Counter market is an irregular market established for
the purpose of creating a market for the occasional sale of French or
foreign securities. 183 The Over-The-Counter market does not create a
permanent market for any security. Rather, the seller and purchaser of
securities simply simultaneously exchange the securities for full payment.
Any company or shareholder may cause securities to be listed on the
Over-The-Counter market by filing an application with the SBF and pub-
lishing certain minimum financial information concerning the issuer. 184
2. Listing of Securities
a. Initial Public Offerings
Before engaging in an initial public offering of securities (appelpub-
lic d l'Jpargne), a company must prepare a prospectus (note
d'information) disclosing certain specific information required by the
COB. 85 The COB mandates disclosure concerning the following issues:
all relevant facts concerning the securities and the issuer; a description of
the issuer's principal activities, including its business(es), employees, and
subsidiaries; recent financial information, including balance sheets and
profit and loss statements; the names of officers, directors, senior man-
agement and controlling shareholders, and any relationships thereto; the
reasons for the issuance and planned use of proceeds; and the financial
institution advising the issuer and guaranteeing placement of the securi-
ties." 6 A summary of the prospectus may also be required. 187
A prospectus must be approved by the COB before it can be issued
to the public. The COB may require an issuer to change the prospectus,
or it may conduct an investigation to determine the accuracy of the
disclosures.
182 Id.
183 See DOING BusiNEss IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 15.04[2][c].
184 CBV Regulation of April 21, supra note 177, at arts. 3-4.
185 A prospectus must be issued in any transaction which would constitute an offer of or for
securities, including a tender offer. See Ordinance 67-833, supra note 154, at art. 6.
186 The full requirements are set forth in Annex I to the Instruction of February 2, 1982 of the
Commission des Operations de Bourse Relating to Prospectuses Distributed by Companies Making
Public Offerings (Pub. COB: 1982).
187 Id. at ch. 2.
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b. Listing of Foreign Securities
Foreign securities of a non-EEC issuer may be listed after approval
by the Minister of Economy. 188 The request for listing must include cer-
tain economic, financial and legal information,189 and be sent simultane-
ously to both the COB and the CBV 19° . The COB has the right to seek
any additional documents concerning or prepared by the issuer during
the prior three years so that the information offered to the French public
is equivalent to that supplied by local (or EC) issuers, and the COB must
give its recommendation to the Ministry within two months from receipt
of the application. 191
IV. THE MERGERS AND AcQuISITION PROCESS IN FRANCE
United States-style takeovers have been arriving in France since at
least 1988. The battles for control of such large, well-known French
companies as T616m6canique, a major manufacturer of mechanical and
electrical equipment, the liqueur company B6n~dictine, and the luxury-
goods, champagne and cognac house Mo~t-Hennessy Louis Vuitton
("LVMH") demonstrated that even hostile bids can succeed in France.
However, such bids have also spurred an outcry by many in France, in-
cluding President Mitterand who has bitterly attacked "financial specula-
tors" living off of the "easy money" made through such bids.
The political backlash against takeovers has had its effect, both
legal and practical. France has recently adopted regulations requiring
greater disclosure by bidders and making it more difficult to remove in-
cumbent management. 192 On a more practical level, France's more than
$11 billion of acquisitions abroad in 1988 were almost triple the nearly $4
billion in French assets sold to foreigners during the same period. 193
A. § 4.01. The Regulatory Framework
France does not have one law which regulates tender offers or dis-
188 See Regulation No. 88-04 of the Commission des Operations de Bourse Relating to the Listing
of Securities, approved by Arr&6 of July 6, 1988, [1988] J.O. 8 Juillet at 2410 [hereinafter Regulation
88-04]. Regulatory requirements for the listing of foreign securities are contained in arts. 14-18, 27-
28, 36-37 and 42.
189 Documents which must accompany the application include the issuer's last three annual re-
ports; a memorandum describing the issuer's business activities, prospects and capital structure; and
the market(s) for its shares. Id.
190 The application must be filed by a financial institution or stock broker authorized to do busi-
ness in France. Id. at art. 57.
191 Id. at art. 14.
192 See infra notes 217-224 and accompanying text.
193 See EUROPEAN DEAL REVIEW, supra note 2.
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closure obligations such as the Williams Act in the United States. 1 94
Rather, takeovers may be regulated by a number of official or quasi-gov-
ernmental groups, including the CBV, which is responsible for the analy-
sis and approval of the price of a cash tender offer (offires publiques
d'achat) and the terms and conditions of a share exchange offer (offres
publiques d6change); the COB, which must approve any prospectus and
other public statements disseminated to shareholders during a tender of-
fer; and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which coordinates the
creation of regulations governing takeovers and has control over agencies
governing foreign investments ("Direction du Trisor") and antitrust
("Direction Gdndrale de la Concurrence").1 95
Representatives of these three organizations sit on the Supervisory
Board of Takeovers ("Comiti de Surevillance des offres publiques
d'achat"), which serves more as a coordinator for the three agencies than
a supervisory body. In practice, the divisions between the various bodies
are sometimes difficult to discern. 196
The takeover rules in France are contained principally in the re-
cently adopted Law No. 89-531 of August 2, 1989 relating to the Secur-
ity and Transparence of the Financial Markets ("Law 89-531")197, and
regulations promulgated by the COB and CBV. However, France's take-
over legislation cannot be considered exhaustive or thorough, and the
practice has been to issue new regulations in response to a specific per-
ceived abuse, rather than general prospective rule-making.198 Takeover
rules in France have changed significantly over the last five years, and it
194 A tender offer occurs when a party, whether individually or in concert with others, invites or
solicits shareholders of a company (the "target") to sell their shares at some specific consideration,
consisting of cash, securities or a combination of the two. The value of the consideration offered
usually exceeds the target's stock by a substantial premium. Target shareholders wishing to accept
the offer "tender" their shares by forwarding them to a depository bank that acts as agent for the
offeror. See Pitt, Tender Offers: Offensive and Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, in
HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 498 (1990).
195 See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
196 See generally Marquardt, Tender Offers in France: The New Rules, 1990 INT. FiN. L. REv. 35
(Jan. 1990).
197 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at 9322. The principal implementing measures, set forth in the
Arritis of September 28, 1989, [1989] J.O. 30 Septembre at 12,301 and 12,307 [hereinafter the Sep-
tember 28 Regulations] include TitleV of the General Regulation of the CBV, and COB Regulation
No. 89-03 [hereinafter Regulation 89-03]. See generally Marquardt, supra note 196. See also France:
Securities Bill, supra note 159, at 98,315. The law was, in general, upheld by the Constitutional
Council in its ruling prior to the promulgation of Law 89-531. See Decision No. 89-260DC of the
Constitutional Council of July 28, 1989, [1989] J.O. 1 Aout at 9676.
198 For example, in response to Chargeurs attempt to gain control of Prouvost through a creeping
accumulation of shares, the government established disclosure regulations upon the bidder's ac-
cumulation of shares. See TAKEOVERS IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 197.
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is anticipated that these rules will continue changing, particularly in re-
sponse to changes in EEC law.
B. § 4.02. Disclosure Obligations for Shareholders and in Tender
Offers
Law 89-531 is the first takeover law in France's history,199 and,
when considered in combination with the implementing measures
adopted on September 28, 1989, has substantially modified both the dis-
closure and substantive requirements for bidders and targets in a tender
offer 2°°. While the rules are expected to have only a negligible impact
upon overall takeover activity, they will have a substantial effect on how
takeovers, and in particular tender offers, are conducted. The legislation
also has a number of features in common with the EEC's Draft Directive
Thirteen on Takeover Bids, 201 and it is likely that French legislation will
continue to develop in tandem with EEC legislation 02.
There are two general types of tender offers in France: an all cash
offer (offrepublique d'achat or "OPA") or an offer which includes securi-
ties (offre publique ddchange or "OPE"). The disclosure requirements
for both the bidder and the target in a tender offer will be discussed after
the following more general review of the disclosure obligations for large
shareholders.
L General Disclosure Obligations for Large Shareholders
Pre-tender offer disclosure obligations in France vary according to a
company's charter, the amount of shares owned, and the purpose of the
ownership. Thus, disclosure of share ownership may be required by a
company's charter, which can mandate that transfers of capital or voting
control of, at a minimum, one-half of one percent be reported to the
company. 203 The time within which disclosure must be made and to
whom may also be determined by the charter.
Law 89-531 requires the public disclosure of anyone owning the fol-
199 Prior to 1989, regulations concerning takeovers were of lesser authority.
200 See Marquardt, supra note 196, at 36-37.
201 Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and
Other General Bids, 64 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 138) 7 (1989), reprinted in [current] Comm. Mrkt.
L. Rep. (CCH) 60,200 at 10,401.
202 See generally Berger 1 "The Second Common Market: Development of A United Standard for
Reviewing The Actions Of Target Directors in the United States and European Community," 9 Int.
Tax & Bus. Law - (1991) (forthcoming) (detailed review of Draft Directive Thirteen and Compara-
tive Analysis with U.S. legislation). [hereinafter "Second Common Market"]; Berger, "Buying Up
Europe In New Buyout Regime," Legal Times, Feb 4, 1991 at 26.
203 Law No. 66-537, supra note 8, at art. 356. See also Marquardt, supra note 196, at 36.
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lowing amounts of the capital or voting rights of a French company with
listed shares: five percent; ten percent; twenty percent; thirty-three and
one-third percent; fifty percent; and sixty-six and one-sixth percent.20 4
Disclosure to the company must be made within fifteen days, and, if the
shares are traded on the Official Market, then there must be disclosure to
the CBV within five market days.2 "5 Law 89-531 also requires disclosure
by any group of purchasers "acting in concert" whose holdings counted
together meet one of the above thresholds.20 6 The "acting in concert"
standard, new to French corporate law, is defined as an agreement to
purchase or sell voting rights or to follow a common purpose with re-
spect to the securities.20 7 There is a rebuttable presumption that a com-
pany is acting in concert with its officers, directors and companies under
its control or with which the company shares common ownership.
208
There are substantial penalties for failing to comply with the disclo-
sure requirements. The law provides that shareholders who fail to make
the required disclosures may lose for up to two years the voting rights of
the shares in excess of the disclosure thresholds.2" In addition, voting
rights may be suspended for up to five years by the commercial court if,
upon the request of the company, its shareholders or the COB, the cir-
cumstances are shown to have warranted such a penalty.21 0
204 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 17. This includes the ownership of securities, such as
warrants or convertible debentures, which may lead to the ownership of shares and voting rights.
205 Id. at art. 18. The new rule changes prior law by requiring that voting rights, not just capital
ownership, be taken into account when determining the statutory thresholds. This substantially
broadens the scope of the law because under French corporate law companies can, and frequently
do, split voting rights from other attributes of share ownership. See supra notes 45-49 and accompa-
nying text.
206 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 18. Cf. Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (19-) (requiring any person who acquires more than five percent of any equity securities
registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act") to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a Schedule 13D within ten days of the acquisition, setting forth specified information
about the purchaser and the acquisition). See also Second Common Market, supra note 202 (analyz-
ing comparable EC and US legislation).
207 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 17. Cf. Block, Hoff & Berger, Considerations in Stock
Accumulation Programs, in HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW MARKET
ENVIRONMENT (1988) (discussing how comparable legislation applies in the United States); Second
Common Market, supra note 202 (discussing analogous provision in Draft Directive Thirteen).
208 Whether a written agreement will be required before the "acting in concert" standard is satis-
fied is still under debate. In the attempt by Paribas to acquire Compagnie de Navigation Mixte
("Mixte"), Paribas complained about the parallel action taken by certain stockholders friendly to
Mixte. In their replies to the CBV, these stockholders denied that they had an obligation to file
because they had no written agreement between them or with Mixte. See Marquardt, supra note
196, at 36-37. Persons acting in concert are jointly and severally liable for the disclosure obligations.
209 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 20. The two year period does not begin until the required
disclosure has been made. The previous maximum suspension period was three months.
210 Id. The suspension period may include the right to vote shares below the disclosure
thresholds.
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a. Disclosure Upon Acquiring Ten Percent Ownership of a
Company's Shares
Disclosure must be made by anyone acquiring ten percent or more
of the capital or voting rights of a privatized company.21 1 This disclosure
must include the cost and the number of shares purchased, and must be
made to the Minister in charge of the economy.212 Within ten days the
minister may oppose such acquisitions for the protection of national in-
terests through a decision setting forth the grounds for the opposition.
This provision exists only until December 31, 1992.213
b. Disclosure Upon Acquiring Twenty Percent Ownership of a
Company's Outstanding Shares
COB Regulation No. 88-02 of April 12, 1988 requires any person or
entity who acquires more than twenty percent of the capital or voting
rights of a company listed on either the Official Exchange or the Second
Market to declare the objectives it intends to pursue during the next
twelve months.214 The disclosure must include whether the acquiror in-
tends to continue to purchase more shares, acquire control of the com-
pany, request appointment as a director, and whether the acquiror is
acting alone or in concert with others.2 15 In addition to the target com-
pany and the CBV, disclosure must be published on the securities listing,
announced in nationally distributed financial newspapers and sent to the
216press agencies.
2. Disclosure Obligations of the Bidder
a. Disclosure to the CBV
Before commencing an offer, the offeror must file an application
2 17
with the CBV through the banking institution(s) guaranteeing the financ-
ing arrangements for the offer. The required disclosure includes informa-
tion concerning the bidder's intentions in making the bid, any plans the
211 The list of companies privatized by the government are listed as annex to Law No. 86-793 of
July 2, 1986, [1986] J.O. 3 Juillet at 8240(4).
212 Law No. 89-465 of July 10, 1989, [1989] J.O. I1 Juillet at 8671.
213 Id.
214 COB Regulation No. 88-02, approved by Arr&6 of April21, 1988, [1988] J.0. 23 Avril at 5395
[hereinafter Regulation 88-02].
215 Id. at art. 3. The disclosure is similar to that required in a Schedule 13D, required under the
Williams Act in the United States. See supra note 206, at n.8-9.
216 Regulation 88-02, supra note 214, at art. 3.
217 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5; see also Regulation No. 88-01, approved
by Arr6t6 of April 21, 1988, [1988] J.O. 23 Avril at 5394. Securities firms as well as banks have the
authority to file such an application.
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bidder may have if the offer is successful, the minimum number of securi-
ties which the offeror is willing to accept, the form of payment (including
the basis for a valuation of any securities which are included in the offer),
and the means for payment.21
The CBV then notifies the SBF which automatically suspends trad-
ing in the securities of the target company upon receipt of the applica-
tion, and also notifies the government and the COB of the application.2" 9
The CBV then has five days to approve the application and, in particular,
to determine whether the consideration provided in the offer is reason-
able and within the public interest.2 20 If approval is granted, the CBV
publishes a notice of approval and trading may resume within two mar-
ket days.2 2' Until such notice is published, the offeror must obtain the
CBV's approval prior to making any public disclosure concerning the
offer.
The CBV publishes a third notice upon being notified of the COB's
approval of the offeror's prospectus and any other regulatory
requirements.
b. Disclosure to the COB
Within twenty-four hours of the offeror's filing with the CBV, the
offeror must file a draft prospectus (note d'information) with the COB. 22
The prospectus, while generally less detailed than that required in the
United States, must include information concerning the purpose for the
offer, the future plans of the offeror (including any agreements or con-
tracts entered into by the offeror), the financing for the offer, the number
of shares being offered, and the timetable for the offer.223 The COB has
five trading days following the filing of the draft prospectus to approve or
seek amendment to the disclosures contained therein. As soon as the
prospectus is approved, it must be sent to the target company and made
218 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5. If applicable, the file is also to contain a
copy of the necessary authorization request required for regulated foreign investments. Id. The
general disclosures are similar to the tender offer disclosures required by the Williams Act in the
United States. See Sections 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), 78n(e),
78n(f); Second Common Market, supra note 202. (analyzing U.S. and EC tender offer regulations).
219 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5.
220 Id. See also DOING BUSINESS IN FRANCE, supra note 11, at § 15.04 (reviewing factors consid-
ered by CBV).
221 Id. Approval is made only on the terms of the offer; the CBV does not have jurisdiction or
responsibility for antitrust or other issues unrelated to the offer's terms. Trading may (and in prac-
tice frequently is) suspended for more than the five day minimum period.
222 See COB Regulation 89-03, supra note 197, at art. 8.
223 Id. For a discussion of the minimum and maximum amount of time an offer can remain open
see infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
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available to the target company's shareholders; in addition, the essential
terms of the offer must be published in appropriate newspapers and fi-
nancial journals no later than four days after the COB's approval.22 4
3. Target Disclosure Obligations
The target company must file an information circular for approval
of the COB within six trading days of the receipt of the bidder's approved
prospectus. 225 The circular (also less detailed than that required under
the Williams Act in the United States) must include the Board's opinion
on whether shareholders should accept or reject the offer and the rea-
son(s) therefore, any risks associated with the offer, the number of shares
owned by officers and directors and their ownership levels from one year
prior to the offer, and whether the Board's opinion was unanimous or
simply a majority.226 The COB has three trading days to approve the
circular after which the approved circular must then be provided to
shareholders, and published in appropriate publications within four trad-
ing days from the COB's decision.227
C. § 4.03. The Substantive Law of Tender Offers
1. Timing of the Offer and Competing Bids
A tender offer must remain open for at least twenty days from the
date of the avis d'ouverture. Tenders made by shareholders may be with-
drawn at any time during the offer.228 Any agreement entered into after
a tender offer is made by a shareholder to tender shares is
unenforceable.22 9
Competing bids may be submitted until ten calendar (not market)
days before the closing date of the original offer. 230 The CBV will then
224 Regulation 89-03, supra note 197, at art. 12.
225 Id. at art. 11. In friendly deals the target and the bidder may make a joint filing.
226 Id. at art. 12.
227 Id. The target may be required to file with the COB a copy of the financial journal in which
the circular was published. Management is also required to give notice to the company's workers
committee (comitd d'enterprise) of the takeover bid. The workers committee may request a meeting
with the offeror in a further effort to provide employees with early and full information. Law 89-
531, supra note 110, at art. 40.
228 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5. Prior to this regulation, tenders became
irrevocable ten days prior to the expiration of the offer. The new regulation is similar to Rule 14d-7
under the Williams Act in the United States, which allows shareholders to withdraw their shares
during the entire period which the offer is open. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1988).
229 Kiernan, Bedos & d'Ornano, supra note 151, at 30.
230 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5. Under the prior legislation, competing
bids had to be submitted no more than twenty days before the original offer closed, while offers were
required to remain open for thirty days.
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extend the duration of the original offer so that both offers will close on
the same date. Competing cash offers must be at a price of at least 102
percent of the prior offer, but no increase is required where the original
offer was a partial offer, Le. for less than all of the target's outstanding
shares and the competing offer is for all shares.23' No minimum increase
is required if the offeror raises the price of the original bid.232 After ten
weeks, the CBV may set a deadline for the submission of final bids.
If the offer is all-cash for all shares, the bidder may purchase shares
of the target on the open market during the pendency of the offer, but the
offer price is then automatically increased to the greater of either 102
percent of the offer price or the price paid on the market.233 If the offer is
for less than all shares, or includes some securities as consideration, the
bidder may not purchase any shares during the pendency of the bid.
Once the bid closes, and prior to the time the results are officially an-
nounced by the CBV, the offeror (and any members of his/her group)
may not sell any of the target's securities, and may only purchase addi-
tional securities on the open market at the offering price.234
2. Mandatory Tender Offers
Law 89-531 established the concept of mandatory tender offers in
France.235 Under the previous law, a purchaser who obtained a "control
bloc" (acquisition de bloc de contrdle) had to extend an equivalent offer to
minority shareholders, either through a tender offer or a standing buy
order (maintien de cours) over a fifteen trading-day period on the stock
exchange. This system came under much criticism, both because of the
lack of regulatory definition of "control bloc" and the maintien de cours
system.236 Under the new regulation, an offeror must bid for at least
two-thirds of the target's outstanding voting stock upon obtaining 33-1/3
percent of the target's capital shares.237 A tender offer is also required if
231 Id. Previously, competing offers had to be at 105% of the prior offers.
232 Regulation 89-03, supra note 197, at art. 13. Like a competing bidder, previous increases by
the bidder had to be an increase of at least five percent over the value of the previous offer. See
generally Marquadt, supra note 196.
233 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5. Under the previous rules, the offering
price was increased to 105 percent of the offer price.
234 For the definition of a "group" see supra note 215 and accompanying text. Non-group mem-
bers who may be sympathetic to the bidder are not bound by this restriction, as was seen in the
recent tender offer for Compagnie de Navigation Mixte.
235 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 15 (establishing the principal of a mandatory offer). See
also September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 5 (implementing legislation); Second Common
Market, supra note 202 (discussing principle of mandatory tender offer in Draft Directive Thirteen).
236 See generally Kiernan, Bedos & d'Ornano, supra note 151, at 29.
237 September 28 Regulations, supra note 197, at art. 3. This provision may also be triggered if
the 33 1/3 percent level is crossed indirectly through, for example, the acquisition of another coin-
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a person holding between one-third and one-half of a company's equity
securities or voting rights increases their holdings by more than two per-
cent over one year, or increases their ownership to more than fifty per-
cent of the target's securities as a result of their purchases.
There are a number of exceptions to the mandatory tender offer pro-
vision, including if the crossing of the thirty-three percent level was the
result of a decrease in the number of outstanding shares, if the target is
already under the control of a third party, or if the bidder owns less than
thirty-seven percent of the outstanding shares and promises to reduce his
ownership level to thirty-three percent within eighteen months.238 An
exemption must be approved by the CBV, and it is not yet clear how
willing the CBV will be to grant such an exemption.
A tender offer may also be required by the CBV to allow minority
shareholders an opportuniy to "cash out" their shares under certain lim-
ited circumstances. For example, if the bidder holds ninety-five percent
of the voting shares of the target, or controls the target and seeks to
either transform an SA into another corporate form or change the com-
pany's articles or by-laws in a material way, the CBV may order an offer
to be made.
3. Defensive Maneuvers
Once a tender offer has been made, a board is severely limited in the
actions it may take to defeat the offer. The COB requires that the inter-
ests of the shareholders remain the dominant concern, and the target
must exercise "particular prudence" in redeploying assets or taking other
extraordinary corporate actions.239 The COB must be notified of all ac-
tions beyond the ordinary course of business, and measures taken pri-
marily to defeat the offer are, as a general matter, prohibited.240 These
rules act as a significant deterrent to a board considering the adoption of
some of the defensive measures available to a board in the United States
after a hostile offer is made.
Partly, in response to these limitations, many supporters of tender
offer reform sought to strengthen the position of incumbent management
pany, if the shares owned by that company constitute an "essential part" of the third company's
assets. See Marquardt, supra note 196, at 38.
238 Additional exceptions include if the threshold level is passed as a result of a merger approved
by shareholders, or the company is already controlled by the bidder and the acquisition is only a
transfer from one entity to another, without changing the group which already controls the bidder.
See generally Lee, supra note 159.
239 Regulation 89-03, supra note 197, at art. 3. See generally Berger, supra note 48.
240 Regulation 89-03, supra note 197, at art. 3; see also Kiernan, Bedos & d'Ornano, supra note
151, at 30.
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to defeat hostile bids. However, while the recently enacted legislation
increased management's options in some areas, it also reduced the ability
of a target to defeat an unwanted proposal in other ways, and generally
should not have a significant impact on whether or not an offer is
successful.2 4 1
The target's ability to defeat an offer was increased because the new
legislation allows a target company to increase its share capital during
the pendency of an offer.242 Traditionally, French law requires share-
holder approval for the issuance of any capital, and this approval was, as
a practical matter, nearly impossible to obtain during the offer period.24
Under the new legislation, the target board would retain the right to is-
sue stock during an offer provided that the increase had been approved at
a shareholders meeting prior to the offer (autorisation prialable de
Passemblde gdnirale). This authorization must be given prior to the offer
being made, is limited to no more than one year from the meeting, and
sharply limits the board's ability to waive the preemptive rights of share-
holders. 2 4 The requirement that preemptive rights be maintained may
limit the usefulness of this defensive tactic.
The new law also limits the rights of a target board to refuse to call a
shareholder's meeting after the offer is completed, or to vote shares held
by a subsidiary company during the offer. Specifically, the new legisla-
tion provides that shareholders controlling the majority of the voting or
equity stock upon completion of a tender offer may call a shareholder's
meeting if the target board does not do so, thereby allowing the success-
ful offeror the ability to quickly elect a new board.245 The law also elimi-
nates the right of a board to vote "auto-control" shares after July 1,
1991. 246
V. CONCLUSION
The French law of corporations is continuing to evolve as the
French market opens, and in response to international developments.
241 These principles frustrated T16m .anique's attempt to be acquired by a white squire upon the
hostile offer by Schneider in 1988. Upon the announcement of Schneider's offers, T16m~anique
transferred ten percent of its capital to its white squire, Framatone, which shortly thereafter
launched a competing bid. The court subsequently held that this transfer violated the principles of
"good faith, prudence and equality among shareholders" as required by the COB.
242 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 14.
243 See generally Marquandt, supra note 196.
244 Law 89-531, supra note 110, at art. 14.
245 Id. at art. 16.
246 Id. at art. 21. "Auto-control" refers to the practice of a company's use of a subsidiary to hold
up to ten percent of the parent company's stock as a defensive measure against a hostile offeror. See
supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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These changes will have a significant impact upon a foreign company
wishing to establish or purchase a business in France. At the same time,
however, these changes will make French regulations more familiar to
American businesses and attorneys, as many of the French rules are de-
rived, at least in part, from similar statutes in the United States or coun-
tries with which American attorneys may be more familiar (i.e., the
United Kingdom). Further, France has made substantial efforts to bring
its markets and corporate law into agreement with applicable EC direc-
tives, and the continuation of this process will make French regulations
more comprehensible to American companies.
In sum, France is fast becoming a favorite spot for American com-
panies looking to enter Europe. France's industry and technology have
made it a leader in a number of European industries, while its govern-
ments have successfully created an economic environment favorable to
foreign investment. Given this framework, a familiarity with French
corporate law is an important step for companies (and their advisors)
looking to take advantage of the unified European market.
